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Abstract Healthcare professionals (HCPs) regularly face re-
quests from parents for predictive genetic testing of children
for adult-onset conditions. Little is known about how HCPs
handle these test requests, given that guidelines recommend
such testing is deferred to adulthood unless there is medical
benefit to testing before that time. Our study explored the
process of decision-making between HCPs and parents.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 34 HCPs in
8 regional genetic services across the UK, and data were the-
matically analysed. We found that instead of saying ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to such requests, many HCPs framed the consultation as
an opportunity to negotiate the optimal time of testing. This,
they argued, facilitates parents’ considered decision-making,
since parents’ eventual decisions after requesting a test was
often to defer testing their child. In cases where parents’ re-
quests remained a sustained wish, most HCPs said they would
agree to test, concluding that not testing would not serve the
child’s wider best interest. As a strategy for determining the
child’s best interest and for facilitating shared decision-mak-
ing, we recommend that HCPs re-frame requests for testing
from parents as a discussion about the optimal time of testing
for adult-onset disease.
Keywords Genetic testing . Children . Clinical genetics .
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Introduction
Genetic testing can predict certain inherited conditions many
years before their onset. When the onset is likely to be in
adulthood, testing children before they are able to decide for
themselves whether and when they wish to know about their
inheritance can present healthcare professionals (HCPs) with
ethical, social, and legal challenges. Professional guidelines
have been issued to support HCPs in their decision-making.
In Europe, these were first published in 1994 by the UK
Clinical Genetics Society (CGS), (Clarke 1994) and in 1995
by the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) and
American Society of Human Genetics (ACMG) (American
Society of Human Genetics Board of Directors and
American College of Medical Genetics Board of Directors
1995). These were followed by several others (Borry et al.
2009; British Society for Human Genetics 2010; Tozzo et al.
2012; Ross et al. 2013). The recommendations from these
guidelines are well-established and have not changed signifi-
cantly over time. Their primary message is that unless testing
has current medical benefit, it should be deferred until a child
is old enough to make her/his own decision (Fenwick 2010;
Lucassen and Montgomery 2010; Anderson et al. 2015)
protecting what Feinberg called the child’s right to an open
future (Feinberg 1980; Bredenoord et al. 2014). Such guid-
ance also aims to minimise potential psychological harm - to
parents and the child - associated with knowing that the child
is at risk of a serious condition, about which nothing can be
done at present (Wade et al. 2013; Wertz et al. 1994).
Although professional consensus not to test in childhood
for later-onset conditions has been consistent, there has been a
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noticeable change in emphasis as genetic technology has
encompassed genomic testing. The ACMG’s (Ross et al.
2013) and the ASHG’s (Botkin et al. 2015) position state-
ments both assert that predictive genetic testing may be ethi-
cally acceptable in certain circumstances, such as when it
would resolve parental anxiety. According to Geelen et al.
(2011), such guidance shifts attention away from a primary
focus on protecting the child’s future autonomous choices
towards promoting a discussion between professionals and
parents about what is in the child’s ‘best interest’. This can
be seen as a subtle move of focus from the future adult to the
current child. The British Society for Human Genetics
(BSHG) guidelines (2010) argue, for example, that profes-
sionals should aim at assessing, together with parents, the
harms and benefits of testing and the ASHG position state-
ment refers to ‘exploring reasons’ and to ‘thorough delibera-
tion’ (Botkin et al. 2015). Despite this, there is nothing to
suggest that testing would be recommended when there is
no medical utility.
Experience from clinical practice and empirical studies
suggests that, when a genetic condition is diagnosed in a fam-
ily, many parents want their child tested to find out whether
she/he is likely to develop a genetic condition in the future.
There is evidence that parents request, or will want to request,
such testing, despite the child having no symptoms of the
condition in question and when there is no treatment or pre-
vention available during childhood (Campbell and Ross 2005;
Shkedi-Rafid et al. 2015). Indeed the advent of faster, cheaper
genetic technologies and the perceived promise of more infor-
mation from genomic testing likely means that requests from
parents to test their children, before medical benefit, will in-
crease in the future. Requests for predictive genetic testing for
later-onset diseases is also increasingly encountered following
other testing in a family. For example, incidental or additional
findings from genomic testing in other family members may
give rise to requests for testing in a child. HCPs must negotiate
a difficult tension between an ethical obligation to encourage
deferral of testing to enable the future adult to make their own
choices and parents’ perceived rights to decide on behalf of
their child, while ensuring they act in the best interest of the
child (Roche and Berg 2015; Pelias 2006; Wilfond and Ross
2009).
Duncan et al. (2005) who surveyed clinical geneticists in
the USA, Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand, found
that clinicians sometimes provide testing for later-onset con-
ditions for reasons beyond purely medical ones when
confronted with parental requests. While we know this hap-
pens, little is known about how HCPs handle parental test
requests in practice. How do they balance competing interests
and for what reasons do they enable such testing in childhood?
Understanding the difficulties they encounter, and how they
weigh different factors to make a decision about whether test-
ing would be in a child’s best interest, becomes increasingly
important as genomic testing raises more challenges in this
arena.
In this paper, we describe how HCPs responded to parents’
requests for predictive genetic testing in cases when there was
no medical benefit at the time of testing. We explore how
HCPs balanced different factors to come to a decision; how
they communicatedwith parents about their requests; and how
existing guidelines related to their decision-making practice.
We examine approaches to a range of predictive genetic tests
in children, including for reproductive risks, i.e. ‘carrier
testing’.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
We sought the views of HCPs with experience in genetic
testing and, in particular, those who had dealt with parents
who had made requests for testing at a time when there was
no medical benefit, and explored how they managed such
requests in practice. HCPs were purposively sampled from
UK professional groups (e.g., BSGM, CGS, and the UK
Cancer Genetics Group), regional genetics services, and the
UKGenethics Forum - a national group that meets regularly to
discuss ethical issues arising from clinical practice. As the
research progressed we adopted a snowballing strategy to im-
prove recruitment. We sampled a mixed group because we did
not intend to draw conclusions about any one profession, but
rather about HCPs who face parental requests.
Data Generation and Analysis
We used in-depth interviews to explore HCPs’ approaches to
test requests and the extent to which these reflected current
guidance. The interviews followed a semi-structured frame-
work, which we developed with reference to existing literature
and discussions with our patient and professional steering
group. Interviews lasted 45–90 min, were digitally recorded
and transcribed, and then data were thematically analysed to
develop a conceptual framework of recurrent themes between
and within participants’ accounts (Braun and Clarke 2013).
We used an iterative process whereby emerging themes were
explored in subsequent interviews to enable a better under-
standing of them and to explore differences and agreement
between different HCPs. Quotes from participants are includ-
ed to illustrate our findings and the professional background.
Participant number (e.g. P1) is indicated for each quote. The
research team operated as an interpretative community (Miller
and Dingwall 1997) reviewing transcripts, conducting the
analysis, and discussing emergent findings.
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Results
Sample Characteristics
In total, our sample was 34 HCPs: 13 genetic counselors, 13
consultant clinical geneticists and 8 HCPs outside of clinical
genetics but who were involved with genetic testing (e.g. pe-
diatricians). Of these, 26 were female and 8 male, and 27 were
based in England, 4 in Wales, and 3 in Scotland.
Themes
We identified three key themes: (1) the future autonomy prin-
ciple, (2) balancing no medical benefit and other factors in the
assessment of best interests, and (3) reframing the request as
when, not whether, to test.
Theme 1: The future autonomy principle
Participants supported the key principle in guidelines (see,
for example, BSHG 2010) that the protection of a child’s
future autonomy was an important argument against testing
(young) children for later-onset conditions. However, they
varied in how strongly they held to the principle in their deci-
sion making in practice. There was general consensus that it
should be applied when there was clearly no medical benefit
at the time of the request for testing; for example testing a
baby for Huntington disease or inherited breast cancer (e.g.
BRCA1/2). Despite this general support, some HCPs thought
that most young people/adults would not mind having had a
predictive genetic test as a child without their input into the
decision and, as such, the impact of a test result on a future
adult’s autonomy could be overstated. However, as one HCP
noted, for a few it would be an issue:
The reason for not testing them is so they can make their
own decision in the future. I would imagine that for 95%
of them it’s not going to be a big issue as to whether or
not they’re tested now as opposed to in the future and it’s
us being more protective of them. But, of course, it’s that
5%, how big an issue is it going to be for them and I
don’t think we know^ (Consultant, P21).
Given that we do not know who would mind at the time of
the request for testing, adopting a general principle can be an
appropriate and ethical approach.
HCPs differed in their application of the principle for (au-
tosomal recessive) carrier testing. Some thought that a positive
carrier test result was not the same as burdening a child with
the knowledge of developing, or being at risk of, a medical
condition in adulthood. Others argued that the principle
should apply, on the basis that knowledge about carrier status
is appropriate only at an age when potential carriers are
making reproductive decisions or when they can understand
the reproductive implications of the result. Predicting disease
in a child’s future offspring was viewed as equally inappro-
priate and as lacking in medical benefit in childhood as
predicting later-onset disease in the child:
I don’t see that it’s any different from any other genetic
test where it’s not going to have any [immediate benefit].
You can’t predict how somebody’s going to react to a
result that somebody is a carrier or how they’ll under-
stand it (Counselor, P32).
The way HCPs interpreted guidelines played a key role in
how they balanced harms and benefits of testing. Some HCPs
were flexible in their interpretation, viewing guidelines as
helpful guidance. Others adopted a very strict rule-based in-
terpretation: unless there was clear identifiable medical bene-
fit, the future autonomy principle was the default position. For
example, one HCP argued that they had a firm policy of not
testing any child under sixteen:
We’ve had quite a number of requests for prediction
work from minors, under 16, and it’s just a categorical
no^ (Counselor, P26).
Theme 2: Balancing no medical benefit and other
factors in the assessment of best interests
All participants referred to an assessment of the child’s
‘best interest’ in decisions about testing but they also
commented on how, in practice, they found it difficult to
make such an assessment. They placed strong emphasis
on medical criteria, taking into account the severity of the
condition; how predictive the test was for the child’s fu-
ture physical health; the difference between the child’s
current age and the likely age of onset; and the availabil-
ity of future treatment or interventions. In fact, many
thought that medical criteria were the only criteria they
themselves could reasonably apply to make a best interest
judgement, identifying the non-medical factors that might
contribute to the assessment of a child’s best interest to be
largely outside their scope of knowledge:
[The] reasons for testing other than for pure medical
reasons are the ones that are very hard in practice,
because they’re the reasons the medical profession has
least insight into and the parent has most insight into…
they’re the hardest to describe. So, if we’re saying in our
guidelines that it is sometimes acceptable to do testing
other than for medical benefit, if the parents can put
forward a compelling argument for that testing to take
place, then it’s quite hard for us to assess how compel-
ling the argument is (Consultant, P13).
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HCPs therefore felt that parents’ role in any best interest
assessment was an important one. For some this meant that
test requests might be met because they believed that parents
were acting in their child’s best interest:
I think that parents on the whole do the best for their child
that they can and if they feel that this is the way forward
then that’s what I would support^ (Counselor, P17).
That is not to say that they felt that their role was simply to
accede to parents’wishes– doing so might not ultimately be in
the child’s best interest.
However, despite this perceived difficulty of identifying
non-medical harms and benefits, in practice, most HCPs indi-
cated that they did draw on factors beyond medical utility
when considering best interests. HCPs found these factors
compelling enough to over-ride the future autonomy principle
and agree to test. These included the likely psychological and
social impact of testing for the child; the parents’ experience
of the genetic condition; whether parents seemed to under-
stand that testing would reveal future (not current) risks; and
the need to maintain a positive relationship with the child and
family; for example:
I think to have [a] blanket approach is quite damaging
… we have to be more flexible with families and see that
it’s not just about medical risk but actually it’s about the
emotional side of things… in families and relationships
together (Counselor, P05).
In some cases, HCPs tested in childhood because they con-
sidered benefit to parents and the family would in turn benefit
the child; for example the impact of parental anxiety on a
child’s welfare in a best interest assessment. They were sym-
pathetic to families with an extensive history of the condition
for which they wanted their child tested; one HCP agreed to
test the child of a parent whose deceased spouse and extended
family had a history of heart disease:
[I] just felt that she just had to know which of her chil-
dren might be at the same risk as her husband with that
… her anxiety levels were so high… so I ended up
testing^ (Consultant, P13).
Similarly the anxiety of not knowing a child’s status could
affect the parents’ relationship with them, so testing was con-
sidered to be the best interest of a child if it could improve this
relationship for this HCP:
…not knowing can affect bonding with young children
and there’s been lots of parents that have reported that
actually the anxiety makes it very difficult for them …
Their parenting skills are affected this couple [who] …
seriously needed to know and they weren’t sleeping…
Testing someone to relieve an anxiety is not an unrea-
sonable request (Counselor, P19).
The potential to avoid parents treating a child differently, if
they assumed that the child had a condition, was another ex-
ample given by our participants: one tested a 9-year old child
at 50 % risk of a faulty P53 gene because:
The family …couldn’t treat the child normally. Every
time they had a headache, they took her to casualty.
They were medicalising the child (Counselor, P09).
Keeping the family engaged with the health service was
deemed better for the child than the parents seeking private
or commercial testing without medical support. This was also
seen as a strong benefit to childhood testing:
If we upset them [by saying ‘no’], we’re not helping the
children in the long run either. That was another thing
that persuaded me to test. An important thing was that
the family were still engaged with us and would come
back to talk about things (Consultant, P34).
Finally, benefit to the family played out in different type of
case where another child had previously been tested and the
result was positive (e.g., carrier status). One participant artic-
ulated this in terms of testing on the grounds of equity:
…when it comes to sharing information, the child who
hasn’t been tested could feel left out…People all want to
be offered the same and have the same opportunities
(Counselor, P19).
Interestingly, they did not weigh this ‘equity’with the child
having lost their ability to make decisions for themselves at a
later date.
Theme 3: Reframing the request as when, not
whether, to test
As illustrated above, for many HCPs the decision-making
process focussed on what they considered to be in the child’s
best interest, taking into account medical and wider reasons.
Another approach to requests for testing was to involve par-
ents in discussion and negotiation about when genetic testing
would be appropriate for their particular child or–to put it
another way–when testing would be in their best interests.
For example, in response to a question about how they would
deal with requests to test children for conditions such as
Huntington disease, one HCP stated:
[the request would] be taken as an invitation to, let’s
think about this disease and how you and your family
Fenwick et al.
are going to handle it…..so it’s just an opportunity to
talk (Consultant, P22).
HCPs expressed a number of connected reasons for re-
framing the request as finding the best time for the test.
First, it was seen as less adversarial: if parents came to clinic
with a request, it would not help the patient-professional rela-
tionship for HCPs to immediately argue that testing was not
permitted or possible. In such cases, HCPs reported that par-
ents would often become more insistent and would not be
willing to engage in further discussion or to consider the po-
tential adverse consequences of testing:
I would never say, ‘no’ that’s it, we’re not going to do it,
because immediately you get their backs up and you’ve
damaged the relationship before it starts (Counselor,
P05).
Another reason was that it created space for discussion
about the pros and cons of testing which could include defer-
ring testing to an age when the child would be old enough to
be involved in the decision-making process:
I usually try to establish quite early on that my job is not
to sit here and refuse testing, it’s to look at all the aspects
and arrive at a good decision that everybody is comfort-
able with, in the best interests (Consultant, P16).
This helped to ensure the child’s ‘voice’ was not lost.
Furthermore, it opened up discussion about the range of
factors that could contribute to the best interest decision.
Indeed, some HCPs saw their role as helping parents to
make an informed decision about what was in the child’s
best interest and understand why testing at that point
might not be:
They come along and say, Bgene test, must-have…^ But,
once you make them aware that there are conse-
quences… then they’re more aware of it. And I think
we’ve had parents who have been very grateful for the
extra conversation (Consultant, P03).
Thus there was a recognition that when parents request
testing they have not necessarily had the opportunity to talk
through the pros and cons and the different options available
to them. HCPs who engaged in discussions rather than agree-
ing or disagreeing with initial requests had often adopted this
approach over time, commenting that when they had less ex-
perience they were more persuaded by parental rights or by
the apparent rules that guidelines provided them. One argued
that the greater the clinical experience a HCP had, the more
comfortable and able they would be to engage in a meaningful
discussion with parents and come to a mutual agreement:
It’s very much people’s individual experience and how
competent they feel in that situation. Some people enjoy
exploring it with the family. Whereas others would much
rather not. But that can work both ways, either
completely withdraw and let the family do exactly what
they want to do, or be paternalistic and say ‘no, you can’t
have it because we’ve got guidelines’. You could avoid
either way, having that discussion (Counselor, P12).
Lack of experience might also make HCPs think they were
legally required to provide the test if requested:
Sometimes tests are done, I think, that may have more to
do with the fear of being sued than [the test] being
necessary (Consultant, P32).
Ultimately, although HCPs reported that parents’ desire to
test often changed after discussion, some parents remained
insistent.When suchwishes were sustained even after detailed
discussions, most HCPs said they would grant the parents’
request, arguing that as long as such a request was informed,
it was something the HCP should try to meet:
At some point you feel that it’s their right to make that
decision and you’re just there to help them make a deci-
sion, not to make the decision for them (Consultant, P22).
In effect, sustained requests meant that HCPs might be
more likely to give more weight to parents’ rights.
Discussion
Our research provides an exploration of the way HCPs respond
to parental requests for predictive genetic testing in children,
and balance the different tensions that arise. We were interested
in the process of decision-making between HCPs and parents
and explored cases where parental desire for their children to be
tested was particularly strong but where there was no immedi-
ate medical benefit to such testing. We focussed on how HCPs
balanced different harms and benefits to come to a decision,
how HCPs communicated with parents about their requests,
and how this practice related to existing guidelines.
Our research showed that HCPs generally thought that a
child’s future autonomy was an important factor when consid-
ering predictive genetic testing and recognised that it could be
harmful to override it in childhood.Most HCPs acknowledged
that the assessment of ‘best interests’ should encompass more
than just medical benefit and, as such, might agree to testing.
Empirical research and guidelines have also recognised the
wider psychosocial benefits of testing in childhood; for exam-
ple: the reduction of uncertainty and anxiety; the opportunity
for psychological adjustment to the condition; the ability to
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make realistic life plans; and the sharing of information with
family members (Botkin et al. 2015). However, it is notable
that some of our participants reported feeling poorly equipped
to judge anything other than medically-related harms and ben-
efits and felt that parents were better able to make judgements
about wider best interests. An assessment of best interest was
challenging, as it was often difficult to separate out the best
interests of an individual child and her/his family and identify
who was best placed to decide. This finding adds weight to
similar conclusions in two recently published studies which
focussed on carrier testing (Noke et al. 2015; Vears et al.
2015). We concentrated more broadly on predictive testing
showing that this is an issue for HCPs for a range of tests.
Re-framing parental requests in terms of finding the best
timing for the test appeared a useful strategy for discussion
around harms and benefits, including deferral of testing to
when the child would be old enough to be involved in the
decision-making process. In other words, it enabled HCPs
and parents to engage in a complex discussion that involved
both addressing an ethical principle and discussing the conse-
quences of actions. By using this approach, HCPs tried to
avoid the child’s ‘voice’ being lost or parents mixing their
own interests with the child’s (Sarangi and Clarke 2002),
while trying to facilitate parents’ considered decision making.
As a result, in many cases, parents’ changed their first
opinion–that testing should happen now–to an informed
choice to defer testing. In some cases, parents’ requests
remained sustained. HCPs were then more willing to grant
the test because they were more confident that parents had
evaluated the pros and cons of testing. This concurs with find-
ings from previous research (Noke et al. 2015).
We agree with Geelen et al. (2011) that discussions should
not be based on a narrow interpretation of best interests.
However, for this to happen in practice, HCPs need to feel
confident in their ability to make decisions. In a recent article,
Birchley (2016) points out that discussions around what con-
stitutes harm can lead to HCPs taking inconsistent approaches
to deciding what is best for a child depending on the weight
given to different factors at different times. He recommends
articulating the values that underpin best interests. We would
argue that this is also useful advice in the context of genetic
testing: a consideration of the context of the request is impor-
tant, but ethical principles such as safeguarding the future
autonomy of the child should not be lost.
Study Limitations
Our study is the first in recent years to investigate HCPs’
views about childhood testing. By adopting a qualitative ap-
proach and framing interviews using published guidelines, we
have produced nuanced findings that have direct relevance to
practice. One potential weakness is that HCPs were self-
selecting and perhaps more likely than those who did not
participate to have contemplated definitions of best interest
and reasons for and against testing children. We did, however,
purposely target recruitment of HCPs who had experience of
parental requests for testing when there was no medical ben-
efit. The majority of our participants were genetic HCPs,
which could be seen as a limitation, since other specialties
are increasingly involved in genetic and genomic testing, but
we do not claim that our findings are generalizable. They may
nevertheless have relevance to HCPs in other clinical settings.
Conclusion and Research Recommendations
Our study focused on cases where parents requested a predic-
tive test for a gene mutation already known about in their
family. We recommend that HCPs adopt the strategy of find-
ing the right time for testing, rather than focusing on whether
or not to test. This more nuanced approach is more in line with
the goal of genetic counseling: to facilitate informed decision-
making. However, there is a challenge for the future when
genome testing becomes part of routine clinical practice, as
HCPs will face further pressures when parents request ‘addi-
tional findings’ indicating later-onset risks from an already
sequenced exome or genome. One difficulty we predict is that
this routinisation could likely mean that the time for consid-
ered decision-making is reduced at the same time as HCPs
with less experience in managing such complex genetic issues
offer tests. This is a challenge for future practice, which will be
exacerbated if a condition is not already known about in the
family and there is lack of time for pre-test information and
counseling (Sukenik-Halevy et al. 2016). Further research is
needed on the impact of these changes on ethical decision
making around genomic testing in children, including deci-
sions about when and how to disclose findings.
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